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I. INTRODUCTION 
Equitable subrogation has been expanded in modem mortgage 
refmancing so far beyond its original purpose, it is creating 
uncertainty in real property. I Consisting of substitution,2 equitable 
"subrogation,,3 at first enabled a guarantor of debt, after paying, to 
assume the satisfied creditor's rights to pursue judgment against the 
defaulting party.4 Courts, based on principles of natural justice, 
granted this legal right "to compel the ultimate discharge of a debt by 
one who in equity and good conscience ought to pay it."s Courts 
reasoned that subrogation served "natural justice.,,6 
Subrogation's roots in equitable justice enabled American courts 
in the 19th and 20th centuries to rationally expand it. 7 Many 
plaintiffs, not just debt guarantors technically called sureties,8 could 
seek subrogation to creditors' rights that plaintiffs had paid off.9 For 
instance, a 19th century Maryland court granted subrogation to a 
ship's clerk who paid a crew's wages out of his own pocket, because 
1. Compare infra Parts II, III.A-C, with III.D, IV. A-B. See also infra Part I 
(summarizing this comparison). 
2. Logan v. Citi Mortg., Inc. (In re Schubert), 437 B.R 787, 792 (Bankr. D. Md. 2010) 
(construing Maryland law); Jackson Co. v. Boylston Mut. Ins., 2 N.E. 103, 104 (Mass. 
1885); Mason v. Sainsbury, (1782) 99 Eng. Rep. 538, (KB.) 540 (Lord Mansfield, 
c.l.) ("Every day the insurer is put in the place of the insured."). See also infra note 
5. 
3. HENRY N. SHELDON, THE LAW OF SUBROGATION § 1 (1st ed. 1882) ("Subrogation is a 
doctrine primarily of equity jurisprudence."); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1563-64 
(9th ed. 2009) (defining subrogation). 
4. See infra note 5; infra Parts II, III.A. 
5. Crisfield v. State ex reI. Handy, 55 Md. 192, 198-99 (1880). 
Id. 
6. Id. 
[W]here one is obliged as surety to pay the debt of another, an 
equity arises in his favor to have all the rights and remedies, 
securities original and collateral, which the creditor may have or 
hold against the principal debtor, transferred to him .... 
The right of the surety to be thus subrogated to all the rights of 
the creditor is not founded on contract, but upon the plainest 
principles of natural justice; and is adopted by Courts of equity to 
compel the ultimate discharge of a debt by one who in equity and 
good conscience ought to pay it. 
7. See infra Part III.A-C; see also Burgoon v. Lavezzo, 92 F.2d 726 (D.C. Cir. 1937) 
(discussing various approaches). 
8. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 3, at 1579-80. 
9. See infra note 10 and accompanying text; infra Part III.C. 
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the ship's company became insolvent and could not repay him. 10 The 
clerk was "substituted" to the "shoes of the crew" and their wage-
claims, and so the court ordered that the clerk be repaid in the 
insolvency proceeding. II 
In mortgage law today, refmancing lenders often can obtain 
subrogation to the earlier date of a paid-off mortgage, though state 
case law imposes various limitations. 12 Possessing a priority claim 
earlier than other creditors is crucial when a borrower becomes 
insolvent because multiple creditors jockey for priority position to 
seize whatever scraps are left. 13 Rarely are all paid in full. 14 In 
Maryland and other jurisdictions today, a refmancer does not need to 
produce an extraordinary story to request justice through subrogation 
because the doctrine now covers a laundry list of error and 
negligence. 15 
Because equitable sUbrogation still is an equitable doctrine granted 
in fact-specific inquiries,16 the doctrine's uncertain application in 
mortgage law is causing concern. 17 Lenders can take steps in the 
10. Abbott v. Bait. & Rappahannock Steam Packet Co., 4 Md. Ch. 310, 317 (1847), 
reprinted in William T. Brantly, Annotation, Horace Abbott and Others v. The 
Baltimore and Rappahannock Steam Packet Co. and Others. March Term, 1847, 4 
REp. CASES ARGUED & ADJUDICATED HIGH CT. CHANCERY MD. 234, 239 (1886). 
11. Id. 
12. See ROBERT KRATOVIL & RAYMOND J. WERNER, MODERN MORTGAGE LAW AND 
PRACTICE §§ 31.01-02 (2d ed. 1981); John C. Murray, Equitable Subrogation: Can a 
Refinancing Mortgagee Establish Priority over Intervening Liens?, 45 REAL PROP. 
TR. & EST. L.J. 249, 250-52 (2010) (discussing three widely-applied stances 
concerning a lender's knowledge in subrogation law); Bruce H. White & William L. 
Medford, Equitable Subrogation: The Saving Grace for Unpeifected Lenders?, 24 
AM. BANKR. INST. J. 38, 38-39 (2005) (discussing that Ohio, Michigan, and Delaware 
forbid equitable subrogation for negligent plaintiffs, and also surveying equitable 
subrogation as applied in bankruptcy); infra Part III.C (discussing the volunteer rule). 
13. See ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND 
CREDITORS: TEXT, CASES, AND PROBLEMS 45--46 (6th ed. 2009). Priority under state 
law often is "[f]irst in time, first in right." Id. at 46. Yet types of creditors, and 
forums like bankruptcy, have varying rules. See id. at 217-27. 
14. See id. at 45--46,217-25; G.E. Capital Mortg. Servs., Inc. v. Levenson, 338 Md. 227, 
235, 657 A.2d 1l70, 1l73-74 (1995) (demonstrating a circumstance where a 
judgment creditor got nothing and the mortgage-holder got everything at a foreclosure 
sale). 
15. See infra Parts II1D-E, IV.B (discussing subrogation to repair negligence and mistake 
in Maryland and also subrogation irrespective of knowledge or negligence under the 
Restatement (Third) of Property: Mortgages). 
16. See infra Parts mE, IV.C. 
17. Murray, supra note 12, at 252; Sang Jun Y 00, Note, A Uniform Test for the Equitable 
Subrogation of Mortgages, 32 CARDOZO L. REv. 2129, 2131-33 (2011) (calling for a 
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marketplace to ensure they have secure legal rights and need not 
resort to this equitable doctrine. 18 Further, the expanded ability of 
lenders in some jurisdictions to use subrogation to leapfrog back to 
an earlier priority date without arguing exceptional circumstances-
as the Third Restatement of Property and, to a lesser extent, a 1995 
Maryland Court of Appeals' decision advocate--creates even more 
uncertainty in real property rights. 19 Courts in the 21st century thus 
are at a crossroads.20 
In 1995, Maryland's highest court in General Electric Capital 
Mortgage Services, Inc. v. Levenson altered Maryland's equitable 
subrogation case law/1 diminishing the state's historic equitable 
approach.22 The court did so partially to serve the economic 
objective of streamlining the foreclosure process.23 This occurred at 
the expense of a judgment creditor, who was left with nothing. 24 
Levenson, as well as the Restatement, have adopted through 
obscure methods25 a guiding principle of preventing unjust 
enrichment/6 which is not central to equitable subrogation's roots27 or 
evolution.28 This permissive subrogation enables refmancers to 
subrogate to earlier mortgages even when negligent in adhering to 
state law. 29 It band-aids systematic mortgage industry problems/o 
which are causing numerous errors in lenders' legal rights. 31 
Providing this band-aid forestalls market-based corrections and 
solutions.32 It further contradicts equitable subrogation's purpose and 
unifonn approach to subrogation in New York State courts' "often confusing and 
uncertain application" of equitable subrogation); cf Grant S. Nelson, Confronting the 
Mortgage Meltdown: A Brief for the Federalization of State Mortgage Foreclosure 
Law, 37 PEPP. L. REv. 583, 633 n.248 (2010) (recommending a unifonn federal 
subrogation law to reduce title insurance costs). 
18. See infra Part IV.A, D. 
19. See infra Parts III.D, IV. 
20. See infra Parts III.E (for Maryland), IV (in Maryland and nationally). 
21. 338 Md. 227, 657 A.2d 1170 (1995); see also irifra Part III.D.1 (for the facts), D.2 
(for analysis). 
22. Compare infra Part III.D, with A-C. 
23. See infra Part III.D.I-2.a. 
24. See irifra Part III.D.l. 
25. See irifra Parts III.D, IV.B. 
26. See infra Parts III.D.2.a, IV.B. 
27. See infra Part II. 
28. See infra Parts III.A-C, IV.B-C. 
29. See infra Parts III.D.2.c, IV.B. 
30. See infra Part IV.A-C. 
31. See infra Part IV.A. 
32. See infra Part IV. 
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development/3 and contravenes the historic role of equity in slowing 
down the foreclosure process to protect the social value of land and 
home. 34 
When used by courts in complex insolvency situations, equitable 
subrogation can be a powerful tool to serve justice35 -one 
fundamental purpose of the adversarial court system. 36 However, 
when subrogation is applied when stripped of equity and in a 
mechanical black-letter law fashion, the doctrine can favor one party 
over another, while solely paying lip service to a fact-specific inquiry 
about what is just.37 
This paper traces the history of equitable subrogation in common 
law in Part II; with a focus on Maryland's legal history in Part III; so 
we can better understand, in Part IV, how subrogation should be 
applied in modern mortgage law. While the Supreme Court famously 
noted that its job is to say what the law is, not what the law should 
be,38 sometimes we must rediscover what the law is, so that we can 
33. See infra Parts II, III.A-C, IV.D. 
34. See infra notes 207-212 and accompanying text. 
35. See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text, infra Part III.A-C, E. 
36. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510 (1947) ("Historically, a lawyer is an officer of 
the court and is bound to work for the advancement of justice while faithfully 
protecting the rightful interests of his clients."); FED. R. CIv. P. I (citing justice as one 
of three guiding principles for procedure); FED. R. EVID. 102 (citing "justly 
determined" outcomes as a goal offederal evidence law); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 
550 U.S. 544, 572-73 (2007) (Stevens, 1., dissenting) (arguing that the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure are permissive in origin, permitting at least the airing of grievances 
and requiring answers from defendants). But see BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra 
note 3, at 62 (noting that no single agreed upon definition exists for the adversary 
system); see also Mancia v. Mayflower Textile Servs. Co., 253 F.R.D. 354, 361 
(2008): 
'The central precept of the adversary process is that out of the 
sharp clash of proofs presented by adversaries in a highly 
structured forensic setting is most likely to come the information 
upon which a neutral and passive decision maker can base the 
resolution of a litigated dispute acceptable to both the parties and 
society.' 
Jd. (quoting STEPHAN LANDSMAN, ABA, SECTION OF LITIG., READINGS ON 
ADVERSARIAL JUSTICE: THE AMERICAN APPROACH TO ADJUDICATION 2 (1988)). Here, 
the formulation emphasizes settling and integrating disputes into a social order. See 
id.; see also 1 WEST'S ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW 136-37 (2d ed. 2005) 
(stating that while courts provide "forums" for Davids to confront Goliaths, the poor's 
disadvantage is undisputable). 
37. See infra Part III.D.2.b-c and text accompanying notes 219-228. 
38. Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162, 178 (1874) ("Our province is to decide what the 
law is, not to declare what it should be. "). 
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know what the law should be. This paper serves that goal. It does so 
by reconsidering equitable subrogation in light of its origin, purpose, 
and history to anchor the doctrine in a fact-specific, discretionary 
inquiry under equity, for furthering substantial justice, when doing so 
harms no one else. 39 
II. ORIGINS 
To understand equitable subrogation, one must first understand its 
equitable context. 40 Equity began in both Roman and British law in 
reaction to the strict formalism of their respective law COurtS.41 
Equity is a "positive jurisprudence" of "important principles" 
founded upon "eternal verities of right and justice.,,42 Equity is not 
meant to supplant law, but "supplement ... defects in particular 
cases.,,43 
Equity principles enable judges to administer justice with 
consistency, thus preventing arbitrary decisions; yet in early Britain, 
case-precedents also were mere "guideposts" to a fact-specific 
jurisprudence under equity principles. 44 These principles have been 
embodied in maxims. 45 They also have been adopted in American 
jurisprudence,46 such as the maxim of clean hands: "[A] man must 
come into a Court of Equity with clean hands.,,47 
39. See supra Part I, infra Parts mE, IV.D, V. 
40. See supra notes 1-11 and accompanying text. 
41. JOHN NORTON POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE §§ 1-15 (3d ed. 
1905) (1881); accord 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 
§§ II.38-41 (Melville M. Bigelow ed., Fred B. Rothman & Co. 13th ed. 1988) (1886); 
see also HENRY L. MCCLINTOCK, HANDBOOK OF THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY 1-2 (2d 
ed. 1948) (noting that Aristotle discussed a similar concept, "Epieikea," a forerunner 
of Roman "Aequitas" and British "Equity"). 
42. POMEROY, supra note 41, § 59; accord STORY, supra note 41, §§ 1.1-5; MCCLINTOCK, 
supra note 41, at 2 ("[Equity is] the fundamental end of attaining what the morals of 
the community regarded as justice in the particular case, and ... discretion in adapting 
the remedy to the particular case .... "). 
43. POMEROY, supra note 41, §§ 45,60. Yet Justice Story sees equity as more deferential 
to law. STORY, supra note 41, §§ 1.1-7, 16. 
44. POMEROY, supra note 41, §§ 45, 60; accord GEO. TUCKER BISPHAM & JOSEPH D. 
McCoy, PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY § § 1.11-12 (1Oth ed. 1923) (1874). 
45. POMEROY, supra note 41, § 120; see also STORY, supra note 41, §§ III.61-64g 
(discussing prominent equitable maxims). 
46. BISPHAM & McCoy, supra note 44, § 1.2; see also POMEROY, supra note 41, § 13 
(noting how states have adapted equity differently). 
47. Dering v. Earl of Winchelsea, (1787) 29 Eng. Rep. 1184 (Exch.) 1185 ("[B]ut when 
this is said, it does not mean a general depravity; it must have an immediate and 
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In American law, subrogation arrived through British common law 
when a surety, guaranteeing a debt, is forced to pay upon default, and 
after paying, the surety appealed to equity courts to pursue repayment 
from the defaulting debtor. 48 American equity courts, based on 
principles of justice, granted this right, not at fIrst available in legal 
courts but soon increasingly SO,49 "to compel the ultimate discharge 
of a debt by one who ... ought to pay it."50 The surety stands "in the 
shoes of the creditor" to pursue reimbursement from the defaulting 
debtor.51 Courts have held this serves justice. 52 
In British law, subrogation's origins in equity have yet to be 
defmitively traced. 53 By the 1500s, British equity had developed a 
justice-based contribution and repayment principle, allowing persons 
liable on a debt to seek repayment if they had paid for themselves 
plus others.54 When one pays off a joint debt, for instance, early 
British courts held that the payer has a contribution right in equity 
against the tardy co-debtors.55 This was before subrogation as a 
necessary relation to the equity sued for."); 9 M. L. E. EQuITY § 34 (West 2011) 
(discussing this maxim in Maryland). 
48. Lidderdale's Ex'rs v. Ex reI. Robinson, 25 U.S. 594, 596 (1827) (recognizing sureties' 
equitable rights in British precedent); Burgoon v. Lavezzo, 92 F.2d 726, 729 (D.C. 
Cir. 1937); Hollingsworth's v. Floyd, 2 H. & G. 87, 90-91 (Md. 1827) (describing 
equitable subrogation of a surety as grounded in chancery courts); accord Note, 
Subrogation and the Volunteer Rule, 24 VA. L. REv. 771, 771-72 (1938) [hereinafter 
Note, Subrogation, VA.]; see also 23 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A 
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS §§ 61:50-51 (4th ed. 2002); 13 SAMUEL 
WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 37:42 (4th 
ed. 2000). Williston notes that the term subrogation in mortgage law implies a not 
quite exact analogy to surety subrogation based in "a court of equity." 13 WILLISTON 
& LORD, supra § 37:42; see also irifra Part UI.A (for Maryland's example). 
49. SHELDON, supra note 3, § 1 (stating subrogation originated in equity jurisprudence, 
but has expanded into courts of law); cf Note, Subrogation, V A., supra note 48, at 
771-73 (discussing how subrogation "has been extended"). 
50. Crisfield v. State ex rei. Handy, 55 Md. 192, 199 (1880). 
51. Id. at 198-99; accord SHELDON, supra note 3, §§ 86-87. 
52. See KRATOVIL & WERNER, supra note 12, § 31.01 (praising "the simple justice it 
accomplishes"); SHELDON, supra note 3, § 86 (quoting Lord Brougham in Hodgson v. 
Shaw, stating that equitable subrogation is "founded on the plainest principles of 
natural reason and justice"); Logan v. Citi Mortg., Inc. (In re Schubert), 437 B.R. 787, 
792 (Bankr. Md. 2010) (citations omitted); Crisfield, 55 Md. at 198-99. 
53. See infra notes 54-63 and accompanying text. 
54. Dering v. Earl of Winchel sea, (1787) 29 Eng. Rep. 1184 (Exc.) 1185-86; Morgan v. 
Seymour, (1637) 21 Eng. Rep. 525 (Ch.) 525; Anonymous, (1557-1602) 21 Eng. Rep. 
1 (Ch.) 1 (citing to a case listed as "9 E. 441 (1469)"); accordM. L. Marasinghe, An 
Historical Introduction to the Doctrine of Subrogation: The Early History of the 
Doctrine I, 10 VAL. U. L. REv. 45, 54-59 (1975). 
55. Anonymous, 21 Eng. Rep. at 1. 
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concept and term had formed. 56 Because a surety can be seen as 
jointly liable with a debtor on a debt, this principle was extended to 
sureties and other insurers. 57 
By 1782 in Britain, Lord Mansfield characterized this process as 
substitution; the insurer metaphorically becomes the insured to seek 
repayment. 58 By 1834, Lord Brougham expressly used substitution 
theory to decide a similar case, without using "subrogation.,,59 A 
British court first used the term in 1851. 60 
Subrogation shares roots with equitable liens and constructive 
trusts as remedies for those who lack legal redress. 61 Most jurists 
focusing on the area distinguish subrogation from those concepts 
because of subrogation's substitution concept born in the surety 
context. 62 Tracing subrogation's development, one can posit that 
sureties' recurring need to seek repayment from those defaulting on 
obligations likely carved through courts' repetitive experience of it 
the unique substitution process of subrogation; this then embodied 
and transformed a pre-existing contribution and repayment 
principle. 63 
56. See Marasinghe, supra note 54, at 54--59. 
57. See Morgan, 21 Eng. Rep. at 525. 
58. Mason v. Sainsbury, (1782) 99 Eng. Rep. 538 (K.B.) 540; cf Ex parte Crisp, (1744) 
23 Eng. Rep. 87 (Ch.) 88 (noting that a surety is "intitled [sic] to have an assignment 
of the security" after paying a debt, but that a petitioner who merely pays a debt 
cannot gain a security). 
59. Hodgson v. Shaw, (1834) 40 Eng. Rep. 70 (Ch.) 73. 
60. M.L. Marasinghe, An Historical Introduction to the Doctrine of Subrogation: The 
Early History of the Doctrine II, 10 VAL. U. L. REv. 275, 287-89 (1976) (discussing 
the first use of the term in Quebec Fire Assurance Co. v. St. Louis (1851) 13 Eng. 
Rep. 891 (P.e.) 895-96). 
61. Comment, Subrogation-An Equitable Device for Achieving Preferences and 
Priorities, 31 MICH. L. REv. 826, 826--29, 831-32, 837 (1933) [hereinafter Comment, 
Subrogation, MICH.]; accord Note, Subrogation, VA., supra note 48, at 774. 
62. Most authorities support the theory that subrogation is a unique substitution process 
providing an equitable right to pursue repayment. See supra notes 2, 5, 7,48, 54, 58; 
supra Part I; infra Part II. Marasinghe argues Lord Hardwicke's 1744 codification of 
this contribution principle as a trust doctrine is most authoritative. Marasinghe, supra 
note 54, at 60-65; Marasinghe, supra note 60, at 281-84. However, the principle 
existed at least two centuries before this codification. Marasinghe, supra note 54, at 
54--56. Lord Mansfield later codified it as substitution. Id at 65. This substitution 
characterization, combined with sureties' experiences, carved subrogation's contour 
into jurisprudence. See infra Part II.; cf OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON 
LAW 1 (45th printing 1923) (1881) (liThe life of the law has not been logic: it has been 
experience. "). The substitution nature of subrogation is especially true when tracing 
its development in America. See supra Part I; infra Parts II, III.A-e. 
63. See supra notes 54--62 and accompanying text; cf HOLMES, supra note 62. 
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In the 1800s, American courts began to develop subrogation more 
fully than their British counterparts, including using its substitution 
concept to assign repayment as early as 1799 in Virginia, 1807 in 
Maryland, and 1815 in New York; and in 1818, the U.S. Supreme 
Court used the verb "subrogated" to describe this process. 64 In fact, 
Maryland had codified a surety's subrogation right by statute in 
1763.65 (It remains so codified.)66 In 1827, the U.S. Supreme Court 
upheld a surety's statutory subrogation, noting it could have done so 
upon "a general principal [sic]. ,,67 
While American courts developed and expanded subrogation, 68 
British jurisprudence temporarily retreated in 1827.69 By the end of 
the 1800s in America, subrogation had expanded to apply to 
refmancing lenders in some jurisdictions, including Maryland. 70 By 
the 1920s and 1930s, American subrogation covered various just 
claims by plaintiffs to stand in another's shoes and seek repayment. 71 
64. Wayles v. Randolph, 6 Va. (2 Call) 125, 161-62, 188 (Va. 1799) (providing an 
opinion that first contains the attorney arguing then the court endorsing repayment); 
Tinsley v. Anderson, 7 Va. (3 Call) 329, 333 (Va. 1802) (stating sureties that pay a 
debt "ought to be placed in the situation of the creditors"); Norwood v. Norwood, 2 H. 
& 1. 238, 243 (Md. 1807); Ghiselin & Worthington v. Fergusson, 4 H. & 1. 522,522, 
526 (Md. 1819) ("[A surety] shall be considered to stand in the place of the 
creditor ... to answer the ends of justice. ") (explaining that the surety can pursue all 
remedies of that creditor, including a rightful refund from a trustee); Cheesebrough v. 
Millard, 1 N.Y. Ch. Ann. 190, 190 (N.Y. Ch. 1815) ("[T]he doctrine of substitution 
[is] founded on mere equity and benevolence."); Lenox v. Prout, 16 u.s. 520, 520, 
522 (1818) (citing Maryland law and holding that a creditor can pursue the debtor or 
surety at any time). 
65. Prout, 16 u.s. at 520, 522 (citing 1763.Md. Laws ch. 23, §§ 7, 8); accord James 
Morfit Mullen, The Equitable Doctrine of Subrogation, 3 MD. L. REv. 201, 206-07 
(1939) [hereinafter Mullen, Subrogation, MD.]. 
66. MD. CODE ANN. COM. LAW § 15--401 (West 2012). The original statute was updated 
and amended in 1864, 1924, and thereafter. Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v. Maryland 
Cas. Co., 23 F. Supp. 1008,1009 (D. Md. 1938). 
67. Lidderdale's Ex'rs v. Robinson's Ex'r, 25 U.S. 594,598 (1827). 
68. See infra Part III.B. 
69. Copis v. Middleton, (1823) 37 Eng. Rep. 1083 (Ch.) 1083-84; see also Crisfield v. 
State ex rei. Hardy, 55 Md. 192, 198-99 (1880) (discussing this British judicial 
retrenchment, how it was overturned by statute, and affirming an expansive view of 
subrogation based upon "the plainest principles of natural justice"). 
70. Milholland v. Tiffany, 64 Md. 455,462-65,2 A. 831, 835-36 (Md. 1886); see also 
Home Say. Bank v. Bierstadt, 48 N.E. 161, 162 (TIl. 1897) ("[Equitable subrogation] 
has been steadily expanding and growing in importance and extent in its application to 
various subjects and classes of persons."); Gilbert v. Gilbert, 39 Iowa 657, 660-61 
(1874); Snelling v. Mcintyre, 6 Abb. N. Cas. 469, 471-72 (N.Y. Sup. 1879); Levy v. 
Martin, 4 N.W. 35, 38 (Wis. 1880). 
71. Note, Subrogation, VA., supra note 48, at 772-74; see also infra Part lII.C. 
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III. EQUITABLE SUBROGATION IN MARYLAND 
In regard to mortgage refmancing, equitable subrogation fIrst 
expanded from sureties, to payers of debt with justice-based claims 
for repayment, to lenders who make mistakes. 72 The 1995 Court of 
Appeals decision of General Electric Capital Mortgage Services, Inc. 
v. Levenson troubles Maryland precedent because it rewrote the 
doctrine's fundamental terms without expressly announcing it,73 and 
because the opinion expands what Maryland courts consider to be 
harmless and excusable mistakes when granting subrogation. 74 
Maryland courts still adhere to an equitable approach to 
subrogation,75 though how the doctrine will evolve is uncertain. 76 
A. Early Case Law 
The earliest Maryland cases dealing with equitable subrogation 
upheld a surety's right to an assignment of a judgment against the 
principal debtor after paying that judgment. 77 In the early 1800s, 
Maryland's highest court handled mostly thorny applications of this 
principle: In 1822, the court held that a surety who accidentally 
overpaid a creditor was subrogated to that creditor's right to pursue 
the overpaid funds in the hands of the sheriff overseeing an 
insolvency sale. 78 In 1827, equitable assignment was denied to a 
surety who made partial payment. 79 Subrogation generally requires 
full payment. 80 
In 1833, the Maryland Court of Appeals used the subrogation 
doctrine beyond surety law. 81 The court equitably enabled an estate 
administrator who paid off creditors of an estate before obtaining the 
estate's assets, which were inadequate, to obtain the paid creditors' 
72. Compare infra Part III.A, with III.B, D. 
73. See infra Part III.D.2.a. 
74. See infra Part IIl.D.2.b-c. 
75. See infra Part III.E. 
76. See infra Parts III.E, IV.C-D. 
77. See Norwood v. Norwood, 2 H. & 1. 238,238 (Md. 1807); Sotheren's Lessee v. Reed, 
4 H. & 1. 307, 309-10 (Md. 1818); Lenox v. Prout, 16 U.S. 520, 526 (1818) (deciding 
a case under Maryland law); Ghiselin & Worthington v. Fergusson, 4 H. & J. 522, 526 
(Md. 1819). 
78. See Merryman v. Harris, 5 H. & 1. 423, 426-27 (Md. 1822). 
79. See Hollingsworth's v. Floyd, 2 H. & G. 87,91 (Md. 1827). 
80. See Packam v. German Fire Ins. Co. of BaIt., 91 Md. 515, 528, 46 A 1066, 1069 
(1900). Full payment usually is required by state courts. See 73 AM. JUR. 2D. 
Subrogation § 5 (2011). 
81. See Collinson v. Owens, 6 G. & 1. 4, 9 (Md. 1833). 
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legal rights in an equity court against the remaining estate at the time 
of the distribution. 82 The court did so based on pure equitable 
considerations,83 based upon what was found just in a fact-specific 
inquiry.84 The decision augured the expansion to come. 85 
B. Equitable Subrogation and Refinancing 
The Court of Appeals in 1850 refused to extend SUbrogation to a 
lender who refmanced his own loan-releasing the earlier loan, and 
creating a new, later-dated mortgage-when land records revealed 
the existence of in-between creditors and so put the refmancer on 
constructive notice of their liens. 86 These in-between creditors are 
often called "intervening. ,,87 The court valued legal diligence over 
repairing error when stating that the refinancer should have checked 
the land records, noticed intervening creditors, and not released the 
prior lien. 88 
Thirty years later, Maryland expanded subrogation to a 
refmancing lender who provided money to extinguish a valid prior 
lien in a refinancing transaction voided by fraud. 89 The court held 
that the refmancer, named Tiffany, could be subrogated to the prior 
lien's rights, because not doing so would defraud Tiffany; further, the 
intervening creditors had notice of the prior lien when originally 
extending credit, so reviving it caused no harm.90 The court did note 
that Tiffany should have been on inquiry notice of problems with 
these particular borrowers, yet still granted subrogation on "the 
plainest principles of justice. ,,91 Plus, doing so harmed none. 92 
82. Id. at 4,8-10. 
83. Id. at 12 ("He unquestionably was entitled to some relief."). 
84. See supra Part II (on equity). In Collinson, the Court· of Appeals discussed the case in 
detail and balanced competing equities and principles at play. See 6 G. & 1. at 4-6; 
see also, e.g., BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 3, at 617 (defining "equitable" 
as "[j]ust; consistent with principles of justice and right"); id. at 619 (defining 
"equity" as "[t]he recourse to principles of justice to correct or supplement the law as 
applied to particular circumstances"). 
85. See infra Part mB-C, E. 
86. Woollen v. Hillen, 9 Gill 185, 185-86 (Md. 1850). The court did not use the term 
constructive notice. Id. 
87. See, e.g., G.E. Capital Mortg. Servs., Inc. v. Levenson, 338 Md. 227, 238 n.l, 657 
A.2d 1170, 1175 n.1 (1995); Bennett v. Westfall, 186 Md. 148, 153, 46 A.2d 358, 360 
(1946). 
88. Woollen, 9 Gill at 188-89. 
89. Milholland v. Tiffany, 64 Md. 455, 456-57, 2 A. 831, 832 (1886). 
90. Id. at 462, 464, 2 A. at 835-36. 
91. Id. at 462,2 A. at 835. 
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In 1946, the court expanded sUbrogation again by enabling a 
refmancer, who was negligent in not checking the land records during 
a commercial refmancing, to subrogate to the prior but extinguished 
mortgage.93 In Bennett v. Westfall, for the fIrst time in Maryland, 
subrogation became open to refmancers who lacked legal rights due 
solely to their own error, as opposed to the fraud already discussed in 
Milholland v. Tiffany.94 
The court still used a balancing of equities approach in deciding 
Bennett v. Westfall, mixing subrogation language95 with the 
negligence doctrine that one who pleads negligence must show 
harm. 96 Here, an intervening creditor must show harm to their 
interests to prevent another's sUbrogation.97 The opinion contains no 
express reference to justice and the historical subrogation language is 
toned down.98 
A fact-specific examination of Bennett v. Westfall notes that the 
refmancer, Mr. Westfall, was refmancing a $773 original loan that he 
previously made to a couple to extend payment for one year, to 
prevent the couple from defaulting. 99 It was a small transaction 
between individuals. 100 In this context, the mishap is local in 
effect. 101 However, Bennett v. Westfall and similar holdings have 
been extended to justify permitting mass commercial lenders that 
make mistakes to band-aid their errors through subrogation, even 
92. !d. Subrogation can be granted "provided it does not interfere with intervening rights 
and incumbrances." Id. at 460,2 A. at 834 (emphasis omitted). 
93. Compare Bennett v. Westfall, 186 Md. 148, 154-55, 46 A.2d 358, 361 (1946) 
(expanding subrogation to a party who negligently failed to check land records), with 
Woollen v. Hillen, 9 Gill 185 (Md. 1850) (refusing to extend subrogation in light of 
constructive notice). 
94. Compare Bennett, 186 Md. at 154-55,46 A.2d at 361 (extending subrogation despite 
a party's negligent failure to check land records), with Milholland, 64 Md. at 455, 2 A. 
at 831 (permitting subrogation where a party was defrauded). 
95. Bennett, 186 Md. at 155,46 A.2d at 361 ("[I]t cannot be said that under the facts in 
this case appellee intended to substitute a junior lien for a senior lien and thus place 
the intervening judgment ahead of his mortgage."). 
96. Id. at 154, 46 A.2d at 361 ('''[O]ne who relies on the negligence of another as a 
ground for recovery ... must show ... prejudice in reliance thereon.'" (quoting Holt 
v. Mitchell, 43 P.2d 388, 389 (Col. 1935)). 
97. Id. at 154, 46 A.2d at 361. 
98. See id. at 154-55,46 A.2d at 361. 
99. Id. at 150,46 A.2d at 359. 
100. See id. 
101. See id. 
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though these lenders interact with tens of thousands of parties. 102 
Bennett v. Westfall, which evaluated harm only to intervening 
creditors, was reasoned in the context of individuals engaging in a 
community transaction; it did not encompass and consider national, 
or even global, mass-market lending under 21st century realities. 103 
C. The Volunteer Debate 
As equitable subrogation nationally expanded in the fIrst decades 
of the 20th century, American courts and scholars debated how far 
subrogation should go in helping those with solely justice-based 
claims to repayment. 104 Some courts granted equitable subrogation to 
deserving plaintiffs as long as they were not "mere volunteers," like 
gift givers, who suddenly want repayment; other courts defmed 
"mere volunteers" more widely, thus excluding voluntary commercial 
actors, like refInancers with no stake in the prior loans.105 This divide 
remains. 106 Courts generally also refused subrogation if it would 
harm someone else. 107 By the 1930s, most courts were expanding 
subrogation "if justice may be served."108 Likewise most law review 
articles in the 1920s and 1930s opining on equitable SUbrogation 
voiced support for the expansive view. 109 Maryland, in the 21st 
century, adopts the expansive position. 110 
102. See, e.g., G.E. Capital Mortg. Serv., Inc. v. Levenson, 338 Md. 227, 240, 657 A.2d 
1170, 1176 (1995); see also infra Parts III.D.2.b-c (discussing this case), IV.A 
(describing the modem lending market), IV.B (discussing the permissive Restatement 
position). 
103. Compare supra Part III.B, with infra Part IV.A. 
104. Burgoon v. Lavezzo, 92 F.2d 726 (D.C. Cir. 1937) (discussing courts' approaches 
nationally and reluctantly choosing an expansive approach to create uniformity in 
federal courts). 
105. Note, Subrogation of Purchaser to Rights of Senior Mortgage Against Junior 
Encumbrances, 48 YALE L.J. 683, 686-87 (1939) [hereinafter Note, Subrogation, 
YALE). 
106. Compare In re Lewis, 398 F.3d 735, 747-49 (6th Cir. 2005) (discussing Michigan law 
excluding voluntary commercial actors), with Hill v. Cross Country Settlements, LLC, 
402 Md. 281,302--05 & n.15, 936 A.2d 343,355-57 & n.15 (2007) (excluding only 
gift-givers and intermeddlers). 
107. Note, Subrogation, YALE, supra note 105, at 688 ("[A]ll courts agree that subrogation 
may not successfully be invoked where interested parties have, in good faith, changed 
their positions in reliance upon the discharge of the obligation in question."). This 
principle lives on. See 73 AM. JUR. 20 Subrogation § 5 (2011) ("[S]ubrogation must 
not work any injustice to the rights of others."). 
1 08. Note, Subrogation, YALE, supra note 1 05, at 689. 
109. Mullen, Subrogation, MD., supra note 65, at 201 (discussing subrogation approvingly 
and calling it "a doctrine of great importance"); Note, Mortgages-Subrogation-
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D. General Electric Capital Mortgage Services, Inc. v. Levenson 
The court in this case rewrote the doctrine of subrogation in 
Maryland, without specifically announcing this intention. III The 
court's alteration removed subrogation's well-established and historic 
focus from the plaintiff seeking it,112 downplayed the harm caused to 
the intervening creditor in this case,l13 and expanded excusable 
neglect. 114 The case did not entirely change subrogation, because 
Maryland courts continue to cite Levenson's anomalous holding 
alongside other Maryland precedent. ll5 Nevertheless this precedent 
causes concern. 116 
1. Facts and Holding 
In Levenson, G.E. Capital, as owner of a refmancing loan, moved 
to foreclose on a residential property without any knowledge of an 
intervening lienholder: a judgment creditor named Levenson. ll7 A 
title search preceding the refmancing failed to notify the refmancing 
lender, because the homeowner failed to disclose it, and the judgment 
against the homeowner was registered under an alias. 1I8 However, 
several days before the foreclosure sale, another title search found the 
judgment. 119 G.E. Capital advised its foreclosure sale representative 
to bid up to $45,000 for the house because its interest was protected if 
Merger, 9 N.Y.U. L. Q. REv. 378, 378-79 (1932) (criticizing the Georgia Supreme 
Court's 1931 rejection of a plaintiff's equitable argument for subrogation); Note, 
Subrogation in Favor of a "Volunteer", 39 HARv. L. REv. 381, 381-83 (1926) 
[hereinafter Note, Subrogation, HARv.] (arguing for excluding only officious payers 
from subrogation); see also Note, Subrogation, VA., supra note 48, at 771-77 
(describing the theoretical expansion of subrogation in equity, and highlighting 
remaining doctrinal problems); Note, Subrogation, YALE, supra note 105, at 685,689 
(discussmg subrogation's expansion as a justice-based remedy); cf Comment, 
Subrogation, MICH., supra note 61, at 836-37 (applauding subrogation's remedial 
uses, while calling for more "thoughtful revaluation of [its] economic purposes"). 
110. Hill, 402 Md. at 304-05,936 A.2d at 357 (excluding officious intermeddlers). 
Ill. See infra Part III.D.2.a. 
112. See infra Part III.D.2. 
113. See infra Part III.D.I, D.2.b. 
114. See infra Part III.D.2.c. 
115. See infra Part III.E. 
116. See infra Parts III.D.2, lV.C-D. 
117. G.E. Capital Mortg. Servs., Inc. v. Levenson, 338 Md. 227, 233-34, 657 A.2d 1170, 
1172-73 (1995); G.E. Capital Mortg. Servs., Inc. v. Levenson, 101 Md. App. 122, 
126-27,643 A.2d 505,507 (1994). 
118. 338 Md. at 234,657 A.2d at 1173. 
119. Id. 
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it purchased the house at that price, even if Levenson's judgment had 
priority and thus took the $45,000. 120 G.E. Capital succeeded in 
buying the house for $45,000. 121 
The Maryland Court of Appeals upheld the refmancer's right to be 
subrogated to the priority-dated deed that its refmancing 
extinguished; this subrogation gave G.E. Capital a priority over 
Levenson. 122 Thus, G .E. Capital received rights to the foreclosure 
proceeds, plus the house; Levenson got zilch. 123 Second, the court 
held that G.E. Capital did not have to advertise its priority claim as 
based on equitable subrogation, nor did it have to inform Levenson at 
the foreclosure sale that it had an equitable sUbrogation claim that 
would trump his judgment. 124 
Lastly, the court overturned the intermediate court's holding that, 
because subrogation was an equity doctrine dependent on a court's 
grant, a foreclosing lender must go to court fIrst to obtain subrogation 
before foreclosing. 125 The Levensen court disagreed with the Court of 
Special Appeals, primarily because the lower court's holding 
contravened "the policy of Maryland law to expedite mortgage 
foreclosures." 126 
2. Analysis 
a. Covertly changing precedent 
Levenson is notable for its divergence from Maryland precedent, 
though the court's reasoning does not express this intention.127 The 
court does not offer an express argument to alter precedent, which is 
a prime characteristic of common law jurisprudence. 128 The 
Maryland Court of Appeals embraces the common law tradition, 129 
and, for instance, has held that precedent should be overturned when, 
due to changes in society, precedent is no longer "sound" or 
120. Id. at 234-35, 657 A.2d at 1173. 
121. Id. 
122. !d. at 246,657 A.2d at 1179. 
123. Id. at 246-47, 657 A.2d at 1179. 
124. Id. at 243,657 A.2d at 1177-78 (holding the lender's advertisement that it possessed a 
"first priority position," without disclosing more, sufficed to put others on notice). 
125. Id. at 243-44, 657 A.2d at 1177-78. 
126. Id. at 245,657 A.2d at 1178. 
127. Id. at 239-44,657 A.2d at 1175-78 (citing and quoting Maryland precedent with the 
implication of following it). 
128. See Mortimer N. S. Sellers, The Doctrine of Precedent in the United States of 
America, 54 AM. 1. COMPo L. 67,71-75 (2006). 
129. Id. at 74-75. 
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''useful.'' 130 Yet an explanation and rationale for changing 
Maryland's subrogation tradition is missing from Levenson. 
Levenson approvingly discusses Maryland case law, 13l yet its 
holding relies on a characterization of equitable subrogation's core 
principle as preventing unjust enrichment-a characterization alien to 
Maryland precedent. 132 Rather, the court fmds the characterization in 
a mid-20th century mortgage treatise by G.E. Osborne.133 This 
innovative framing also mirrors the Third Restatement of Property, 134 
which was published in 1997, two years after Levensen. 135 
Levenson's citation of persuasive authority played a crucial role in 
its holding, especially the court's reliance on real estate treatises 136 
and Texas case law. 13? In the context of well-established Maryland 
law,138 the court turned to persuasive sources to rationalize that its 
holding served "to prevent unjust enrichment of Levenson." 139 Thus, 
the court interjected persuasive authority into a rich history of 
Maryland subrogation precedent without expressly announcing the 
takeover. 140 
Subrogation's equitable basis in Maryland has been reaffIrmed 
since this 1995 case; however, subrogation's focus on doing 
affIrmative justice, or preventing unjust enrichment, has become 
intertwined and mixed. 141 As the Maryland Court of Appeals stated 
130. Id. 
131. Levenson, 338 Md. at 239-44,657 A.2d at 1175-78. 
132. See supra Part III.A-C. 
133. Levenson, 338 Md at 231-32,657 A.2d at 1172. 
134. Compare supra Part III.D (discussing Levenson and precedent), with infra Part N.B 
(discussing subrogation under the Restatement). 
135. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGs. § 7.6 (1997). 
136. 338 Md. at 231-32,238-39,657 A.2d at 1172, 1175. 
137. Jd. at 247-50, 657 A.2d at 1179-81. 
138. See supra Part UI.A-B. 
139. 338 Md. at 242,657 A.2d at 1177. 
140. See id. at 239, 247-50, 657 A.2d at 1175, 1179-81 (citing and quoting persuasive 
authority without announcing its takeover of Maryland subrogation precedent); see 
also supra note 127 and accompanying text. 
141. Hill v. Cross Country Settlements, LLC, 402 Md. 281, 313, 936 A.2d 343, 362 (2007) 
(distinguishing unjust enrichment and subrogation); Podgurski v. One Beacon Ins. 
Co., 374 Md. 133, 140-41, 821 A.2d 400,405 (2003) (citing both unjust enrichment 
and justice rationales); Riemer v. Columbia Med. Plan Inc., 358 Md. 222, 231-32, 
747 A.2d 677, 682 (2000) (citing both unjust enrichment and justice rationales); see 
also Taylor v. Furnace Assocs. (In re Taylor), 2008 WL 4225761, at *4 (Bankr. D. 
Md. Sept. 10, 2008) (adopting an unjust enrichment rationale). But see Rinn v. First 
Union Nat'l Bank of Md., 176 B.R. 401, 408, 408 n.5 (D. Md. 1995) (adopting a 
justice rationale); Logan v. Citi Mortg., Inc. (In re Shubert), 437 B.R. 787, 792-93 
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in a more recent 2007 subrogation case: "'The object of subrogation 
is the prevention of injustice. It is designed to promote and to 
accomplish justice. ",142 
b. Ignoring notice and prejudice 
The court's holding that subrogation could go forward despite the 
intervening creditor's lack of notice at the foreclosure sale also 
contradicts the notice requirement in prior Maryland cases before 
subrogation will be granted. 143 While the court found "Levenson in 
no worse a position than he was in when his judgments were 
obtained,"I44 Levenson (with judgment in hand) later relied on the 
land records to refrain from bidding at a foreclosure sale. 145 At the 
sale, Levenson relied on public records that his fITst priority claim 
would take the proceeds. 146 Because Levenson lacked notice of 
potential subrogation, he lacked opportunity to protect his interest at 
the sale, and so was prejudiced. 147 
c. Expanding excusable negligence 
Lastly, the court's excuse of the lender and their agents' conduct 
expanded excusable neglect in Maryland subrogation. 148 In 
Levenson, the court excused the plaintiffs two faulty acts: not 
detecting the intervening judgment when refinancing, and not 
providing notice to this judgment creditor at the foreclosure sale. 149 
(Bankr. D. Md. 2010) (relying upon Maryland precedent's justice-based view of 
subrogation). 
142. Hill, 402 Md. at 312,936 A.2d at 362 (quoting Podgurski, 374 Md. at 141, 821 A.2d 
at 405 (quoting 10 SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 
§ 1265 (3d ed. 1957))). 
143. See supra Part UI.B. 
144. Levenson, 338 Md. at 251,657 A.2d at 1181. 
145. Id. at 235, 657 A.2d at 1174. 
146. Id. 
147. Id. at 235,657 A.2d at 1173-74. 
148. Compare id. at 227, 234-36, 251, 657 A.2d at 1173-74, 1181 (granting the 
refinancing lender's equitable subrogation claim priority over judgment liens held by 
Levenson, despite the former's failure to discover existing judgment liens on the 
property during refinancing and provide notice to the judgment creditor of its reI iance 
on the equitable subrogation doctrine prior to the foreclosure sale, because this left 
Levenson in essentially the same position as when the judgment was obtained), with 
Bennett v. Westfall, 186 Md. 148, 154-55, 46 A.2d 358, 361 (1946) (upholding 
Westfall's subrogation claim on appeal despite his failure to search land records for 
judgment liens because this omission, even if negligent, benefited Bennett, a judgment 
lienholder). 
149. See supra Part III.D.1. 
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This went beyond the single act of failing to check the land records 
excused in Bennett v. Westfall. 150 
Further, Levenson obscures the harm that the plaintiffs neglect in 
fact caused when the plaintiff spurred a chain of events that left 
Levenson disarmed at a foreclosure sale. 151 This encourages further 
courts to discount actual prejudice to others down the road by 
limiting a court's analysis to whether objecting creditors would have 
been harmed solely at the time of obtaining their legal property 
interests. 152 
Excusing neglect has wider social implications. 153 First, waiving 
accountability lowers professional standards, because liability defines 
the contours of what conduct society considers reasonable conduct. 154 
Second, liability is an incentive to avoid error, so permitting more 
error risks encouraging error. 155 Third, providing an equitable 
remedy in Levenson ignores that lenders relying on a title company's 
faulty product or borrower's less-than-honest disclosure do have 
causes of action against those parties. 156 In contrast, subrogation was 
created, then developed, for plaintiffs lacking substantial legal 
remedies. 157 
Fourth and last, a stricter approach safeguards title by providing 
more certainty that land records will be upheld and honored: As one 
attorney argued before the Virginia Supreme Court, "The deed not 
having been recorded within the time prescribed by law is absolutely 
void; or else the ways of law, like The ways of Heaven, are dark and 
intricate, puzzled with mazes, and perplexed with errors.,,158 
d Rationale has been undermined 
The reason the Levenson court voided the intermediate appellate 
court's holding that a foreclosing party first must obtain equitable 
subrogation in court before relying on it at a foreclosure sale was to 
150. 186 Md. at 154-55,46 A.2d at 361. 
151. See supra Part III. D.1. 
152. Levenson, 338 Md. at 251,657 A.2d at 1181. 
153. See infra notes 154-159 and accompanying text. 
154. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283 (1965) ("Unless the actor is a child, the 
standard of conduct to which he must conform to avoid being negligent is that of a 
reasonable man under like circumstances."). This liability standard enables society to 
hold people accountable. Id § 283 cmt. b. 
155. See id § 283. 
156. See, e.g., Hill v. Cross Country Settlement, LLC, 402 Md. 281, 291-92, 936 A.2d 
343, 349-50 (2007). 
157. See supra Parts IT (on creation), III.B-C (on development). 
158. Wayles v. Randolph, 6 Va. (2 Call) 125, 157 (1799) (quoting Hay, Esq.). 
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support "the policy of Maryland law to expedite mortgage 
foreclosures."159 However, since Levenson, and specifically in the 
wake of the 2006-2007 fmancial collapse and resulting national 
foreclosure crisis, Maryland has changed its laws to slow down 
foreclosures. 16o In 2008, the Maryland legislature banned residential 
foreclosures from commencing before a borrower was at least ninety 
days in arrears. 161 Maryland's executive branch in 2007 created a 
Homeownership Taskforce to study and recommend improved 
homeownership and foreclosure policy. 162 The Taskforce stated: "It 
is all too true that the American dream can become a nightmare 
unless we create a sound structure to ensure sustainable 
homeownership.,,163 
Maryland 21st century law and policy favors "a sound structure" 
for home-ownership, including increased transparency and slowness 
in the residential foreclosure process. l64 An expedited foreclosure 
process is no longer the policy of Maryland. 165 The Court of Appeals 
should revisit Levenson in light of its outdated rationale. Further, 
Levenson's expansion of excusable neglect, without a justice-based 
reason to excuse it, undermines the sound structure provided by 
accountability to rules. 166 
159. G.E. Capital Mortg. Servs., Inc. v. Levenson, 338 Md. 227, 245, 657 A.2d 1170, 1178 
(1995). 
160. Compare MD. RULES 14-204 to -212 (West 2012), with MD. RULE W70-W78 
(Michie's 1995). The 1995 statute required little documentation to foreclose. 
Compare MD. RULE W72(a), (d) (Michie's 1995), with MD. RULE 14-207 (West 
2012). The revamped Maryland petition process requires a foreclosing party to show 
not just a right to foreclose, under MD. RULE 14-207(b)(1}-(4) (West 2012), but 
compliance with public policies. [d. (b)(5)-(9). For instance, a foreclosing party 
must show completion of loss mitigation analysis for residential borrowers. [d. 
(b)(6)-(7). See also MD. GEN. AsSEMBLY DEP'T OF LEGISLATIVE SERVICES, THE 90 
DAY REpORT-A REVIEW OF THE 2008 LEGISLATIVE SESSION FI4-17 (2008) 
[hereinafter THE 90 DAY REpORT], available at http://mlis.state.md.usI2008rs/90-Day-
reportlindex.htm (detailing the Maryland legislature's 2008 revamping of foreclosure 
law in the context of an economic recession and "foreclosure crisis"). 
161. S.B. 216, 2008 Leg., 425th Sess. (Md. 2008); H.B. 365,2008 Leg., 425th Sess. (Md. 
2008) (codified at MD. RULE 14-205(b) (West 2012)). 
162. MD. HOMEOWNERSHIP TASKFORCE, MARYLAND HOMEOWNERSHlP TASKFORCE REpORT 
1-6 (2007), available at http://www.gov.state.md.us/documents/Home 
PreservationReport. pdf. 
163. [d. at 1. 
164. See supra notes 159-163 and accompanying text. 
165. THE 90 DAY REpORT, supra note 160, at FI5-FI6. 
166. Compare supra Part III.D.1-2.c, with supra Part III.D.2.d. 
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E. Subrogation in 2011 
Subrogation in Maryland mortgage law remains a substitution 
principle supporting a justice-based remedy. 167 Under a justice 
rationale, Maryland cases hold that a plaintiff paying off a prior 
mortgage-backed loan can obtain equitable subrogation to that earlier 
mortgage if (A) the plaintiffs transaction is legally unenforceable; 168 
(B) the plaintiff did not act as a mere volunteer, but acted under some 
sort of compulsion (legal, moral, or economic) or upon request;169 (C) 
justice is served by subrogation;170 and (D) no creditors' reliance 
interests are harmed by its grant. 171 The justice inquiry in (C), supra, 
remains a fact-specific inquiry.l72 
Further, Maryland courts can raise subrogation sua sponte if its 
elements have been pled. 173 A plaintiff may have been negligent, 
such as mistakenly failed to check land records; 174 or relied upon a 
faulty title search plus made another mistake under Levenson. 175 
167. See infra notes 183-192. 
168. This is the very premise of equitable subrogation. See supra Part III.A-D; accord 
supra Parts I-II. 
169. Hill v. Cross Country Settlements, LLC, 402 Md. 281, 304-05,936 A.2d 343, 357 
(2007); see also Springham v. Kordek, 55 Md. App. 449,453-54,462 A.2d 567, 569-
70 (1983): 
The meaning of "volunteer" therefore is crucial. In this regard 
we have noted three applicable principles: 
(1) One is not a volunteer when he has an interest of his own to 
protect. 
(2) A payment is not voluntary when made under a moral 
obligation, since such is regarded in equity as a form of 
compulsion. 
(3) One is not a volunteer where he pays the debt at the request 
of a person whose liability he discharges. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
170. See supra Part III.A-C. But see supra Part III.D, infra Part III.E (discussing how 
since 1995, Maryland courts can take two differing approaches to formulating this 
rationale). 
171. See, e.g., Rinn v. First Union Nat'l Bank of Md., 176 B.R. 401,409 (D. Md. 1995); 
Bennett v. Westfall, 186 Md. 148, 155, 46 A.2d 358, 361 (1946); Milholland v. 
Tiffany, 64 Md. 455, 462, 2 A. 831, 835 (1886). An analysis whereby a court ensures 
no one is harmed by the grant is a second step in the subrogation analysis. Rinn, 176 
B.R. at 411. 
172. See supra Part III.B-C. 
173. Hill, 402 Md. at 311, 936 A.2d at 361 (citing Bachmann v. Glazer & Glazer, Inc., 316 
Md. 405, 412,599 A.2d 365, 368 (1989». 
174. Bennett, 186 Md. at 154-55,46 A.2d at 361. 
175. G.E. Capital Mortg. Servs., Inc. v. Levenson, 338 Md. 227, 242, 657 A.2d 1170, 1177 
(1995). 
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Some Maryland courts have held that gross negligence and 
inexcusable neglect bar subrogation,176 but not yet the state's highest 
court. In addition, a refinancer cannot leapfrog over an intervening 
judgment creditor via subrogation if the refinancer actually knows 
about the intervening lien. 177 
Maryland courts since 1995 often interweave subrogation with the 
unjust enrichment principle from Levenson. 178 It remains to be seen if 
this interweaving will continue, or if one principle will win out. 
Subrogation is "particularly apt" as a substitution principle, noted the 
Maryland Court of Appeals in 2007. 179 Furthermore, subrogation can 
be distinguished from the contract-based unjust enrichment claim. 180 
Unjust enrichment, in contrast, is an equitable claim focused on those 
who take a benefit from another. 181 Subrogation applies to those who 
pay a debt. 182 
Subrogation in Maryland remains a substitution principle based in 
justice. 183 Maryland courts have granted subrogation, for instance, to 
children who paid their mother's mortgage after the husband fled. 184 
Maryland will subrogate someone to a repayment right who was 
asked to help pay a debt, but not if the debtor never consented to this 
176. Rinn, 176 B.R at 411; Logan v. Citi Mortg., Inc. (In re Schubert), 437 B.R. 787, 796 
(Bankr. D. Md. 2010); see also Egeli v. Wachovia Bank, 184 Md. App. 253, 264-65, 
965 A.2d 87,94 (2009): 
Id. 
Indeed, nearly three years elapsed from Wachovia's payment until 
it formally asserted that it had a superior lien priority to SunTrust 
Bank. 
. . We acknowledge that the transactions at issue took place 
during the home equity boom, at a time when lenders were often 
overwhelmed and therefore may have relaxed their procedural or 
transactional standards. That fact, however, cannot excuse 
lenders, in this case Wachovia, from complying with the strictures 
of the law, especially when their failure to comply works to the 
detriment of other parties .... 
177. Levenson, 338 Md. at 243, 657 A.2d at 1178; accord Citibank Fed. Say. Bank v. New 
Plan Reality Trust, 131 Md. App. 44, 63, 748 A.2d 24,33-34 (2000); Egeli, 184 Md. 
App. at 265, 965 A.2d at 94. 
178. See supra note 141 and accompanying text. 
179. Hill v. Cross Country Settlements, LLC, 402 Md. 281, 315, 936 A.2d 343, 363 
(2007). 
180. Id. at 315, 936 A.2d at 363. 
181. Id. at 295-96,936 A.2d at 351-52. 
182. See supra Parts II, Ill. A-C, E. 
183. See infra notes 184-192 and accompanying text. 
184. Springham v. Kordek, 55 Md. App. 449,450-51,458-59,462 A.2d 567, 568, 572 
( 1983). 
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help. ISS Maryland also rejects opportunistic uses of subrogation, 
denying it to a creditor who voluntarily purchases and pays off a debt 
to acquire rights over a debtor. 186 
The Maryland Court of Special Appeals in Bierman v. Hunter in 
2010 exemplified the use of subrogation as a justice-based, fail-safe 
doctrine, after a fact-specific inquiry. 187 There, a husband 
fraudulently refmanced a mortgage on a home, co-owned with his 
wife, by forging her signature without her knowledge. 188 The 
husband then stole the excess funds, and by the time the lender got 
wind of the fraud, the husband had breezed down to Brazil. 189 The 
court held the defrauded refmancer subrogated to the prior mortgage-
backed loan amount extinguished by the refmancing, and not to one 
penny more. 190 The excess could not fit in that prior mortgage's 
shoes. 191 The fleet husband, if caught, would be liable for the 
excess. 192 
IV. SUBROGATION AND MODERN MORTGAGE 
REFINANCING 
A. The Modern Mortgage Market 
The modem mortgage market has become extremely complex: 
mortgages pass from bank to bank due to bank failures, mergers, and 
consolidations. 193 Further, the lender of old has become fragmented 
into many parts: the issuing lender, title-company, refmancing 
company, debt buyer, mortgage service provider, and foreclosure 
processor. 194 Third, mortgages have been pooled and then sold as 
185. Schilbach v. Schilbach, 171 Md. 405, 407-09,189 A. 432, 433-34 (1937). 
186. McNiece v. Eliason, 78 Md. 168, 174, 176-79,27 A. 940,941-42 (1893). 
187. See Biennan v. Hunter, 190 Md. App. 250,270-75,988 A.2d 530, 542-45 (2010). 
188. Id. at 253-54, 988 A.2d at 532-33. 
189. See id. 
190. Id. at 270, 988 A.2d at 542. 
191. See id.; see also Crisfield v. State ex rei. Handy, 55 Md. 192, 198-99 (1880) ("[T]he 
surety is entitled to stand in the shoes of the creditor .... "). 
192. See Bierman, 190 Md. App. at 270-75,988 A.2d at 542-45. 
193. See, e.g., Robbie Whelan, The 25-Year 'Foreclosure From Hell', WALL ST. J., Dec. 4, 
2010, at Al (detailing how one woman's mortgage-backed loan passed through 
numerous hands during the 1980s Savings and Loan crisis and collapse as well as 
various later bank mergers and acquisitions, and how its current holder could not 
prove a proper assignment of it). 
194. This is apparent through reading mortgage-lending case law. Compare Woolen v. 
Hillen, 9 Gill 185, 195 (Md. 1850), and Bennett v. Westfall, 186 Md. 148,150-51,46 
A.2d 358,359 (1946) (discussed in supra Part llI.B), with G.E. Capital Mortg. Servs., 
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interest-paying mortgage-backed securities; further, these securities 
themselves sometimes are divided and re-packaged as bonds. 195 
Investor-owners and corporate-processors of mortgages are 
experiencing widespread technical difficulties in processing their 
legal claims after mortgages have passed through a proverbial mob of 
hands. 196 Thus, commercial-lender legal claims increasingly are 
deficient in the twenty-first century.197 An April 2006 survey of 
1,300 Chapter 13 cases filed in U.S. Bankruptcy Courts found that a 
majority of mortgage claims were "missing one or more of the 
required pieces of documentation." 198 
Professor Katherine Porter, the survey's author, identifies three 
key components of a mortgage claim in bankruptcy: itemization of 
fees; the mortgage that shows a right to foreclose if the borrower 
defaults on the loan; and the note that details the loan and its terms. 199 
Sixteen percent of mortgage lenders did not produce documents to 
prove fees. 20o Nineteen percent failed to attach an actual mortgage. 201 
Inc. v. Levenson, 338 Md. 227, 231-34, 657 A.2d 1170, 1171-73 (1995)( discussed in 
supra Part II1.D); see also Diane E. Thompson, Foreclosing Modifications: How 
Servicer Incentives Discourage Loan Modifications, 86 WASH. L. REv. 755, 762-64 
(2011) (discussing the "Fragmented Ownership" of the modern mortgage market). 
195. Richard 1. Rosen, The Role of Securitization in Mortgage Lending, CHI. FED LETTER 
(Fed. Res. Bank of Chi., ill.), No. 244, Nov. 2007, available at http://www. 
chicagofed.orgldigital_ assets/publications/chicago _fed _letter/2007 /cflnovember2007 _ 
244.pdf; see also Anderson v. Burson, 424 Md. 232, 237-40, 35 A.3d 452, 455-57 
(2011) (discussing securitization within the context of a dispute over who owns a 
mortgage-backed loan). 
196. See, e.g., Gretchen Morgenson & Andrew Martin, Battle Lines Forming in Clash over 
Foreclosures, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2010, at AI, available at 
http://www.nytimes.coml201 0/1 0121lbusiness/21 standoff.html ?pagewanted=all 
(reporting that banks nationwide buying and selling mortgage-backed securities 
routinely failed to record and assign the mortgages and notes, and many have reported 
to courts that the documents are lost); Tami Luhby, Robo-Signing: Just the Start of 
Bigger Problems, CNNMONEY.COM, (Oct. 22, 2010), 
http://money.cnn.coml20 1 0/1 0/22/real_ estate/foreclosure ---'paperwork ---'problems/ 
index.htm ("The problem is that many servicers don't know where that piece of paper 
[(i.e., the note, stating the loan and its terms)] is."); accord Suzanne Kapner, Us. 
Foreclosure Ruling to Reverberate, FIN. TIMES (U.S. Ed.), Jan. 8,2011, at 2; see also 
Dana Milbank, Foreclosures: The Big Banks' Reign of Errors, WASH. POST, Mar. 6, 
2011, at A19 (detailing the author's problems with Citibank during a simple mortgage 
refinancing) . 
197. Katherine Porter, Misbehavior and Mistake in Bankruptcy Mortgage Claims, 87 TEX. 
L. REv. 121 (2008). 
198. Id. at 121,141. 
199. /d. at 146. 
200. Id. 
201. Id. at 148. 
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A whopping forty-one percent did not attach a note to prove the 
existence of the loan and its agreed-to terms. 202 
Further, the mortgage-backed security investment industry, in 
order to enable the trading of mortgage-backed securities without 
having to update land records with each trade, has established the 
Virginia-based Mortgage Electronic Registration System (MERS) 
database registry, since the mid-1990s, to enable the fluid trading of 
these securities. 203 MERS records itself in the land records as the 
"nominee" on behalf of various, changing, and undisclosed 
investors.204 As of December 2010, MERS had 67 million mortgages 
in its registry. 205 Claims to title are in a million little pieces. 206 
From a well-established policy perspective, courts of equity since 
the 1600s in England and subsequently in America established a 
homeowner's right of redemption after that owner defaulted on a 
mortgage-backed loan; this gives the owner additional time to pay it 
off, out of concern for the ownership of land and home. 207 This 
jurisprudential concern mirrors the view of the special function of 
home in a well-ordered society. 208 
One should note that the current American home ownership 
model, where people and families undertake large loans for large 
homes requiring a large portion of a lifetime to payoff, has its 
detractors.209 There is a relatively new 'tiny home' movement 
criticizing outsized homes and debt, while implicitly still 
202. Id. at 147. 
203. See Ariana Eunjung Cha & Steven Mufson, How the Mortgage Clearinghouse MERS 
Became a Villain in the Foreclosure Mess, WASH. POST, Dec. 30, 2010, http:// 
washingtonpost.com!wp-dyn/contentlartic1e/20 1 01 12/301 AR20 1 0 123003056.html; see 
also Christopher L. Peterson, Foreclosure. Subprime Mortgage Lending. and the 
Mortgage Electronic Registration System, 78 U. CIN. L. REv. 1359, 1363-74 (2010) 
(for further context and analysis). 
204. See Cha & Mufson, supra note 203. 
205. Id. 
206. See id. 
207. See BISPHAM & McCoY, supra note 44, § lI.2I; KRATOVIL & WERNER, supra note 12, 
§§ I.1.I-1.4; Simard v. White, 383 Md. 257, 272-75,859 A.2d 168, 177-79 (2004). 
The equity of redemption was fully established in England under Charles I. Simard, 
383 Md. at 272, 859 A.2d at 177. 
208. See. e.g., Jonathan Miner, Note, The Mortgage Crisis in Historic Perspective: Is 
There Hope?, 36 J. LEGIS. 173, 174-79 (2010) (discussing Thomas Jefferson's view 
that social virtue depended upon an agrarian society of small landowners; and also 
discussing how the 1862 Homestead Act led to individual land ownership and 
economic independence for many, though some criticize the Act's environmentally 
and socially destructive stampede-like results). 
209. See Steven Kurutz, The Next Little Thing?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11,2008, at Fl. 
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acknowledging the value of a home in one's life.21O Thus it can be 
said that while criticisms can be leveled at various patterns of home 
ownership, the belief in home's importance is generally shared. 211 
Expanding the laxness of real-property title requirements through 
subrogation, stripped of an equitable rationale, goes against equity's 
historic role in slowing the mortgage process down to protect land 
ownership and the home, a widely supported value and goal. 212 
B. The Restatement Position 
The Restatement position provides a very permissive approach to 
subrogation. 213 The Restatement states that a refinancing lender, by 
discharging the prior mortgage,214 becomes "the owner" of that 
mortgage and its attached debt,215 regardless of the lender's 
conduce16 Thus it is more permissive even than Levenson, because 
whether Levenson extends to lenders who are grossly negligent is 
unlikely.217 Further, the Restatement extends subrogation to those 
who know of an intervening judgment creditor, while Levenson and 
subsequent Maryland case law do not.218 
The Restatement illustrations also reinforce a use of subrogation as 
a mechanical application of a rule-based test, rather than as an equity 
doctrine applied in fact-specific inquiries.219 The Restatement's 
comments mention subrogation as "an equitable remedy" without 
elaboration,z20 despite the doctrine's enormous equitable history. 221 
Because the Restatement has another subrogation entry under the 
Restatement of Suretyship ,222 this downplaying of subrogation's roots 
210. SHAY SALOMON & NIGEL VALDEZ, LITTLE HOUSE ON A SMALL PLANET, at X-XIV 
(Lyons Press 2006) ("Working in construction, I have watched people's dream houses 
balloon into unmanageable giants. I saw the effects on homeowners, ... and I looked 
for new options .... "). 
211. See id. 
212. Compare supra Part III.D, with text accompanying supra notes 207-208. 
213. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGS. § 7.6(a) (1997). 
214. Id. ("performs the obligation of another"). 
215. Id. ("of the obligation and the mortgage"). 
216. Id. ("to the extent necessary to prevent unjust enrichment"). 
217. See supra note 176; supra Part III.E. 
218. Egeli v. Wachovia Bank, 184 Md. App. 253, 264-67, 965 A.2d 87, 94-95 (2009) 
(discussing Levenson and criticizing the Restatement). 
219. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGS. § 7.6 illus. 1-22 (1997). 
220. § 7.6 cmt. a. 
221. See supra Parts II, III.A-C. 
222. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP & GUAR. § 27 (1996). 
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in surety and equity case law may be an attempt to carve out a 
similarly-named, but separate mortgage-based doctrine. 
Equitable subrogation, according to the Restatement, is meant to 
prevent unjust enrichment of others. 223 This principle is out of line 
with the entire thrust of equitable subrogation as an "affrrmative,,224 
doctrine to do justice for those seeking its application.225 Historically, 
plaintiffs seeking equitable subrogation have come to court for their 
own benefit. 226 This remains true today. 227 
The Restatement focuses on the unjust enrichment of others, as 
well as lack of harm to these same others.228 Thus, the focus is off 
the plaintiff. An unjust enrichment basis for subrogation, combined 
with the Restatement's permissive approach, provides subrogation 
without an equity analysis 0 f a seeker's conduct. 229 In Levenson, the 
unjust enrichment principle enabled the court to downplay the 
lender's mistakes, while still mentioning them, 230 and then justify the 
holding because of a hypothetical, speculative unjust enrichment that 
might have occurred otherwise.231 
This turning away from the plaintiff is a departure from 
subrogation's remedial purpose.232 As a result, the Restatement could 
become a subrogation band-aid for the modem mortgage crisis233 
because lenders will be able to come to court without a focus on their 
own conduct.234 This self-interest will fmd comfort in arguments for 
the Restatement's adoption.235 
223. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGS. § 7.6(a) cmt. a (1997). 
224. Burgoon v. Lavezzo, 92 F.2d 726, 733 (D.e. Cir. 1937). 
225. See supra Parts I, II, III.E. 
226. See supra Parts II, III.A-C. 
227. See, e.g., supra Parts I, m.D-E. 
228. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGS. § 7.6(a) cmt. a (1997) (stating that when 
subrogation is justly and correctly applied, "[t]he holders of intervening interests can 
hardly complain about this result, for they are no worse off than before the senior 
obligation was discharged"); see also id. § 2.2 illus. 2 (expressly illustrating this 
rationale in a mortgage context). 
229. See id. § 7.6(a), cmt. a. 
230. See supra Part III.D.l. 
231. See supra Part III.D.2.b. 
232. See supra Parts II, m.e. 
233. See supra Part IV.A. 
234. See supra text accompanying notes 223-232. 
235. Grant S. Nelson & Dale A. Whitman, Adopting Restatement Mortgage Subrogation 
Principles: Saving Billions of Dollars for Refinancing Homeowners, 2006 BYU L. 
REv. 305 (2006) (offering economic theories for adopting the Restatement); see also 
Kevin M. Baum, Note, Apparently "No Good Deed Goes Unpunished": The 
Earmarking Doctrine, Equitable Subrogation, and Inquiry Notice Are Protections 
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An unjust enrichment foundation for equitable subrogation 
appears to have its origin in the obscure suggestion236 of a short, 
anonymous note in the Harvard Law Review in 1913.237 This 
suggestion to ground subrogation beyond sureties in an unjust 
enrichment principle has only been championed by a few sources 
since, including the Osborne treatise relied upon in Levenson, 238 
importantly by the Restatement (First) of Restitution in 1937 and the 
Restatement (Third) of Property: Mortgages in 1997,239 by Levenson 
itself,240 by a minority of jurisdictions since 1997 relying on the 
Restatement (Third) of Property: Mortgages,241 and by Maryland 
courts since 1995 that cite Levenson.242 
In contrast, the D.C. Court of Appeals in 1937 explained: 
It should be noted, however, in the interest of clarity of 
reasoning in respect of the right of subrogation, that absence 
of injury to the junior lienor can hardly be regarded as a 
predicate for subrogation. Rather it is but a negative factor. 
When Refinancing Consumer Mortgages in an Uncertain Credit Market, 83 ST. 
JOHN'S L. REv. 1361, 1391-93 (2009) (criticizing Michigan's denial of subrogation to 
commercial lenders as "sophisticated creditors" because Michigan banks face a 
"Catch-22" of recordation offices taking longer than the legal deadline permits for 
parties to record). 
236. Note, Equitable Subrogation of Mortgages, 26 HARV. L. REv. 261,262 (1913) ("It is 
not enough to justify equitable [subrogation] that the judgment creditor would be left 
in no worse position, but it is submitted that the doctrine should be applied to prevent 
the judgment creditor from enjoying an inequitable advantage."). 
237. Id. The note suggested this principle as a better foundation for subrogation beyond 
suretyships. Id. at 262. This suggestion was not representative of preceding or 
subsequent scholarship. See Note, Subrogation and Volunteers, 13 HARv. L. REv. 
297, 298 (1899) ("The subject [of subrogation] would be much clearer if it were 
generally recognized that subrogation will be granted when justice demands it."); 
Note, Subrogation, HARv., supra note 109, at 382 (published in 1926); accord sources 
cited supra note 109. A Virginia Law Review commentary notes unjust enrichment as 
an important principle, Note, Subrogation, VA., supra note 48, at 774, then 
emphasizes as more primary "natural justice," "broad principals of equity," and 
"fairness." Id. at 771, 773. 
238. GEORGE E. OSBORNE, THE LAW OF MORTGAGES § 277, at 781 n.l2 (lst ed. 1951) 
(citing Note, Equitable Subrogation of Mortgages, 26 HARv. L. REv. 261, 262 
(1913)). 
239. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION § 162 (1937), cited in Note, Subrogation, VA., 
supra note 48, at 774; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGS. § 7.6(a) (1997). 
240. G.E. Capital Mortg. Servs., Inc. v. Levenson, 338 Md. 227, 239-44, 657 A.2d 1170, 
1175-78 (1995). 
241. See Murray, supra note 12. 
242. See supra note 141. 
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That is to say, the right of subrogation in situations like that 
at bar, is founded on advance of money under mistake of 
fact and must rest on that affIrmative foundation. It will not 
be recognized if innocent persons will be prejudiced.243 
C. The Importance of Equity in Subrogation 
De1inking equitable subrogation from an affIrmative doctrine to do 
justice removes the focus from the seeking party.244 Secondly, a 
black-letter-law approach of mechanically applying a Restatement 
test avoids the fact-specifIc inquiry characteristic of equitable 
subrogation historicalli45 and in Maryland. 246 Third, substituting a 
black-letter test for a balancing of equities reduces a court's equitable 
inquiry/47 more likely excuses egregious conduct,248 and restricts 
others' equitable defenses against a party seeking subrogation. 249 It 
replaces a court's abiding equitable powers for temporary fIxes to 
evolving commercial problems.25o 
The Restatement project purports to be a summarization of the 
common law.251 While this includes ambitiously attempting to survey 
and clarify the common law, it also avowedly includes "seek[ing] to 
anticipate the direction in which the law is 'tending'. ",252 However, 
the adoption by the Restatement (Third) of Property: Mortgages of an 
unjust enrichment rationale that also downplays an equitable analysis 
is a departure.253 It takes courts in the direction of allowing 
subrogation to be an odd, judicial loophole. I state odd because 
243. Burgoon v. Lavezzo, 92 F.2d 726,733 (D.e. Cir. 1937). 
244. See supra notes 228-235 and accompanying text. 
245. See supra Parts II, me. 
246. See supra Part m.A-B, E. 
247. See supra notes 219-222 and accompanying text. 
248. See Egeli v. Wachovia Bank. 184 Md. App. 253, 266-67, 965 A.2d 87, 95 (2009) 
("[A] sophisticated party such as Wachovia must make a more comprehensive inquiry 
. [U]njust enrichment might actually occur by implementing the Restatement 
approach. "). 
249. See Hill v. Cross Country Settlements, LLC, 402 Md. 281, 306, 309-10, 936 A.2d 
343, 358, 360 (2007). 
250. Compare supra Parts II, III.E, with supra Parts III.D, IV.A-B. 
251. Sellers, supra note 128, at 76 (citing AM. LAW INST., CAPTURING THE VOICE OF 
THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE: A HANDBOOK FOR ALI REpORTERS AND THOSE WHO 
REVIEW THEIR WORK 4 (2005». 
252. Jd. at 77. 
253. Compare supra Part IV.B, with supra Parts II-III. 
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without equity it loses its rationale. 254 I state loophole because it 
excuses non-compliance with statutory law.255 
Like the Restatement, the Levenson decision in Maryland 
promotes a band-aid approach to subrogation to keep the mortgage 
market moving/56 and expands excusable negligence for a plaintiff 
seeking subrogation. 257 Levenson cites an economic rationale for 
doing so: ensuring a speedy foreclosure process. 258 
When the Supreme Court of Washington in 2007 adopted an 
aspect of the more permissive Restatement/59 the court justified it 
partially based upon the economic assumption that near-automatic 
subrogation reduces the cost of title insurance. 26o No economic data 
was cited for this assumption. 261 Instead, the court relied on a law 
review article. 262 Yet, whether foreclosure speed creates social and 
economic benefit is a questionable assumption, for mistakes can incur 
court costs, clogged title, and liability for damages.263 
This discussion illustrates subrogation's crossroads: expanding 
subrogation to enable lending speed and convenience versus limiting 
subrogation to an equitable remedy.264 In terms of an economic 
justification, mistakes harm others and cost money and time. 265 In 
terms of a jurisprudential analysis, one can argue that subrogation has 
never been a tool of legislating fixes to statutory real-property 
laws,266 but of doing justice. 267 
254. See supra Part II. 
255. See supra Part IlI.D.2.c. 
256. See supra Part IlI.D.I. 
257. See supra Part II1.D.2.c. 
258. See supra Part III.D.I. 
259. Bank of Am. v. Prestance Corp., 160P.3d 17,18 (Wash. 2007). 
260. Id. at 28-29. 
261. See id. 
262. Id. (citing Grant S. Nelson & Dale A. Whitman, Adopting Restatement Mortgage 
Subrogation Principles: Saving Billions of Dollars for Refinancing Homeowners, 
2006 BYU L. REv. 305,365-66 (2006)). 
263. See supra Part II1.D.1 (describing a case where lender mistakes led to frozen titles, 
confusion of rights, and multiple litigation costs); Part IV.A (describing modem 
mortgage market problems). 
264. Compare supra Part IV.B (discussing the Restatement's nearly automatic subrogation 
approach without analyzing equities), with supra Part Ill.B-C (discussing the 
historical equity analysis in subrogation jurisprudence). 
265. See supra Part III.B, D. 
266. See supra Parts II, III.A-C. 
267. See supra Part IlI.C, E. But see sources cited supra note 235 (arguing for primarily 
economic rationales for subrogation). 
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Equitable subrogation has evolved through a fact-specific 
jurisprudence where transactions often have been more local. 268 
Creditors often have been actual individuals. 269 Subrogation's excuse 
of mistake thus cannot be simply imported into the modem 
commercial marketplace, but demands reexamination in light of the 
risk of mass-lender conduct to so ciety. 270 Subrogation, stripped of an 
equitable basis in affirmative justice,271 could become simply a band-
aid for the self-inflicted wounds of modem mortgage succeSSIOn, 
specialization, and securitization.272 
D. Alternatives and Solutions 
Commercial parties and governments have practical solutions to 
buttress commercial structures and enforce legal rights. 273 Therefore 
in fact-specific inquiries, courts should protect their equity powers to 
do justice among particular parties, rather than water down equity 
jurisprudence with social policy goals like speeding up the 
commercial mortgage market,274 or adopting a Restatement position 
that, maybe subtly, excises equity from sUbrogation.275 
The Maryland Court of Special Appeals, in a 1997 decision 
involving a large-dollar commercial refmancing, commented that it 
would be "a better practice" for refmancing lenders to simply take an 
assignment of the prior mortgage.276 In the court's scenario the 
refmancer, rather than discharging the prior mortgage, would keep 
the original mortgage in place and style its refinancing as "a 
modification ... of the original arrangement.,,277 
States, as with sureties centuries ago,278 can enact statutes 
providing for automatic subrogation when a refmancing lender's loan 
pays off and thus extinguishes a prior loan. Of course, such a statute 
268. See supra Part Ill.A-C. 
269. See supra Part Ill.B-C. 
270. Compare supra Part III.B (discussing how subrogation historically has been used to 
remedy mistakes that were local in effect), with supra Part N.A (discussing how the 
complexities of the modern mortgage market mean that the mistakes made by 
creditors now have broader impact on society). 
271. See supra Parts III.D.2, N.B. 
272. See supra Part N.A. 
273. See infra notes 276-281 and accompanying text. 
274. See supra Parts Ill.D.I-2.a, N.e. 
275. See supra Part N.B. 
276. Springhill Lake lnvestors Ltd. P'shp v. Prince George's Cnty., 114 Md. App. 420, 
442, 690 A.2d 535, 546 (1997). 
277. See id. 
278. See supra notes 66-67. 
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would have to ensure that other creditors relying on public records of 
the earlier-recorded mortgage would have notice about the latest 
owner of the mortgage.279 
Lastly, supporters of the Restatement position have argued that a 
more permissive subrogation promotes efficiency of markets. 280 
However the liability and adjudication arising from mistakes and 
negligence may outweigh any benefit. 281 Further, courts are 
stretching their expertise when crafting holdings based upon 
economic theories, rather than jurisprudential justice principles and 
precedent premised on centuries of institutional knowledge. 282 
v. CONCLUSION 
Equitable subrogation is a powerful tool for courts to serve justice 
and grant a payer of debt a legal right for repayment when fraud, 
mistake, compulsion, or other unfairness has deprived the payer of 
that legal right.283 However if subrogation is shorn of its equitable 
foundation, it can be a mechanical tool without animating purpose, an 
escape-hatch for culpable conduct.284 This escape-hatch will unsettle 
state recordation requirements, without society expressly 
reconsidering these requirements?85 Further, a grounding of this 
doctrine in an unjust enrichment principle takes a court's focus away 
from the party actually seeking the court's equitable powers?86 This 
loss of focus shifts the burden of proof to the objecting creditor and 
away from the plaintiff. 287 In contrast, a party-specific, equity-based 
approach enables courts to grant subrogation to deserving plaintiffs in 
order to do justice.288 Then, once a court has ascertained a plaintiff s 
deserving claim, the court makes a second analysis to ensure 
279. See supra Part III.B (describing courts' concern that other creditors have notice, and 
subrogation will not inflict harm). 
280. See Nelson & Whitman, supra note 235, at 365-66; Robert M. Smith, Note, What 
Happened to the Equity in Equitable Subrogation?, 64 Mo. L. REv. 503, 513-15 
(1999) (arguing that title companies' liability for faulty title searches inflates home 
prices). 
281. See supra Parts III.D, IVA. 
282. Compare supra Parts I-II, with supra Parts III.D, N.B. 
283. See supra Parts I, III.A-C, E. 
284. See supra Parts lll.D.2.b--c, N.A, e. 
285. See supra Parts Ill.D.2, IV.e. 
286. See supra Part III.D.l; supra notes 208-218 and accompanying text. 
287. See supra notes 221-226 and accompanying text. 
288. See supra Part Ill.B, E. 
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subrogation is socially just-that granting subrogation harms no 
one's reliance on publicly-available facts.289 
Gregg H. Mosson t 
289. See supra Part m.B; supra note 232 and accompanying text. 
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